The Road to Xingjiang

When one thinks of China, they do not necessarily associate the country with terrorism.  But surprisingly enough, China has claimed instances of terror within its boarders.  Currently, there is a separation movement in the Northwestern province of Xinjiang.  The People’s Republic of China has claimed that this separation has brought with it elements of terrorism that have threatened the national security of the country.  These claims have been followed up by brutal suppression of human rights in many manifestations and blatant oppression of the people in that area.  China claims state security and the threat of terrorism specifically as its main reason why there has been a crackdown in Xinjiang.  Sources independent of the Chinese government claim the contrary; that it is nothing but a systematic effort to oppress a minority in the country. Given the way the separation movement of Xinjiang has been handled by the PRC, the government of China must have a more comprehensive and transparent approach legally, as well as politically that confines itself to human rights and international law when dealing with the issue of terrorism within its boarders.  Failing to do so question the legitimacy of the PRC’s policy towards terrorism. 

The province of Xinjiang is located in the North West corner of the country.  The province is so large that is consists of roughly 1/6th f the total landmass of mainland China.  The province is bordered by Kazakhstan, to the north, Mongolia to the Northeast, and Kirghizstan and Tajikistan to the North West and West.  To the West and Southwest lie Afghanistan, Pakistan, and to the South are Tibet and India.  Xinjiang, also often referred to as East Turkestan, is home to the Uighuar people, an ethnic minority consisting of around 8 million of the total 20 million people inhabiting the reason.  In terms of numbers, the Uighuars are the largest minority in the region.  The Uighuars are ethnic minorities that akin themselves to Uzbeks and other races of south–eastern Russia such as the Kazaks and Tajiks.  Surprisingly, the Uighuars practice Sufi Islam, a minority, mystical sect of Islam making them one of the largest populations of practicing Sufi Muslims in the entire world. 

The history of the Uighar people is an interesting one that dates back to the 7th century C.E when the Uyghar Empire was formally established.  Firm trade roots along the Silk Road influenced the Uighuar people to the extent that they started adopting cultural, dress, and even agricultural practices from the Chinese. Islamisazation of the region and people started after the defeat of the Mongol Empire sometime in the 12th century.  By the middle of the 15th century, most if not all of the Uighuar population had left behind their Buddhist religion and now accepted Islam as their religion and way of life.  Interestingly enough, with the arrival of Islam, the term “Uighaur“ was dropped but later emerged in 1934 as the official name of the Turkic speaking people in the Xinjiang province.  On October 1, 1955, the Xinjiang Uyghar Autonomous Region was formally established and the Uighuar people recognized as a minority nationality by the Chinese government. 

The People’s Republic of China often regards the activities in Xinjiang Province as “terrorism“ or “acts of terror.“  But nowhere does China have a stable or active definition of terrorism and its variants.  Also, in terms of content, it is interesting to note that a cursory monitoring of East Turkestan related websites reveals very little that can be associated with militant or radical Islam, and almost no calls for an Islamic “Jihad“ against the Chinese State.  Despite that, the separation movement has been considered by the government as part of a greater Pan Jihadist, Pan Islamic movement with moral support by global terror networks, non–state actors such as Al Qaeda and other groups associated with them.  Moreover, the state claims that funding comes from various entities within the Middle East where support for these terror groups are supposedly high.  When discussing the issue of Xinjiang, the PRC has never explicitly stated what these entities are.  Are they private citizens, corporations, states themselves? This has not been determined.  Moreover, claims of training, for what the PRC labels as militants, comes from bordering Pakistan.  Combat experience for these so called militants come from the military environment of Chechnya and Afghanistan.  Again, China has not defined what it deems as a militant and no information is available to back these claims up.  The lack of definitions has the potential to lead to more problems and it undermines the legitimacy of these claims.  This is especially true after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. 

Soon after these attacks, the Chinese government declared support for the new War on Terror, affirming that it, “opposes terrorism of any form and supports actions to combat terrorism.“  Having joined the War on Terror, China made strong efforts to redefine the nature of the Xinjiang issue as one that is inherently related to terror.  Up until this point, China did see the East Turkestan movement as one that was of significant anti–state issue. After September 11, 2001, and after formally joining the War On Terror, China’s approach changed dramatically.  What had generally been described as a handful of separatists was now a full blown “terrorist organization.“  Language in the media also began to shift towards the movement as well.  In a shift, media discourse from Uighuar Separatists to Muslim Terrorist, a covert language policy is being applied for international political ends.  Here lies the problem.  It appears that in the specific case of Xinjiang, the People’s Republic of China does not make a distinction between what is criminal and what is deemed to be terror.  The government of China has claimed that between the years of 1990 and 2001 (a span of 11 years), a total of 162 people have died a result of separatist activity, released in a PRC official document entitled “East Turkestan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity.“  In the same document it associates 57 deaths in small scale attacks.  The document sites some attacks that had no death and minor injuries to victims.  Yet, these incidents have been labelled as “terrorist“ in nature. Though definitions of terrorism are notoriously arbitrary, it seems legitimate to question what makes the unlisted acts as “terrorist“ or “separatist“ as opposed to simply criminal.

Suppression of information undermines the legitimacy of the supposed terror thread inside of China’s boarders.  Inconsistency seems to be consistent with respect to the East Turkestan situation.  The government has on many occasions skewed the accuracy of information on the situation, or in many cases banned information on the issue altogether.  Again, referring to the 162 people dead over a span of 11 years is a good example of that.  Moreover, that information cannot be independently verified by anyone, be it an NGO, other non–state actors or even another state actor other than China. Moreover, in the same report is information missing on the deaths of 105 people in the province witnessed by civilians. These deaths are not even mentioned in the report.  Moreover, it appears as though that any group of any nature with a name consisting of the words “East Turkestan“ have been labelled together in an effort to give the illusion to the citizens of China that the separatist threat is greater than it really is. 

Furthermore, China has made allegations on a number of occasions that cite external Islamic terror networks co–operating with separatist Uighur forces.  One such claim has cited Uighurs have been seen in Islamic Guesthouses in Islamabad, Pakistan.  It has been established as fact that there were cases where a minute number of people separated from these establishments to join the Taliban in neighbouring Afghanistan.  China used this incident as a means of leverage, using it to further back its claim that the East Turkestanis are part of an international Pan Jihadist movement.  There has been no concrete evidence to support this claim.  Moreover, specifically with respect to Pakistan, any mention the South Asian neighbour and ally seems to be unfounded for many reasons.  First, Pakistan has a strategic relationship with the People’s Republic of China.  Even after September 11, 2001, when Pakistan had joined the War On Terror, Sino–Pakistani relations did not diminish.  Rather, they strengthened.  This was proven in 2002 when India antagonized Pakistan by lining up 1 million of its soldiers along the Pakistan–India boarder.  China had supported Pakistan in a diplomatic effort to resolve the situation between the two nuclear powers. 

Pakistan and China share an economic, security and military partnership that has been strong since the creation of Pakistan in 1947.  The majority of trade in Pakistan is conducted with China via the Karakoram Highway, first opened in 1982.  In fact, Pakistan receives military aid from China from this highway that connects the Xinjiang Province to Pakistan.  It has been therefore in Pakistan’s interest to suppress any Uighur interests that’s may be harbouring themselves inside the country.  Since 1990, Pakistan has taking stern measures to quell any fears that Beijing may have with respect to this issue.  Uighar people have been deported back to China, Uighur settlements have been shut down by the government and those that have been alleged to be terrorists have been killed by Pakistan as well.  These are among many other things Pakistan has done in its efforts to appease China.

According to the organization Human Rights Watch, no real unified movement within the province of Xinjiang has emerged.  This can be attributed largely to the fact that basic freedoms are suppressed by the People’s Republic of China.  Having said this, the lack of legal ground covered is insufficient in the context of domestic terrorism and has ultimately contributed to the blatant violation of human rights.

Violation of human rights have plagued the people of Xinjiang for many years now.  Several human rights organizations have condemned the PRC’s treatment of people in the province but the government has not ceased its actions.  In 1996, the PRC undertook the first of many operations under the new policy of what was coined the “Strike Hard Campaign.“  The essential idea of this policy was to “strike hard“ against terrorist and separatist forces in the Xinjiang Province.  Characteristics of this campaign have included summary trials, heavy pressure put on the state judiciary to “process“ many cases within a short, limited amount of time, holding mass sentencing rallies and suppressing religious activity, among other things.  The victims of this campaign have largely been non–violent political protesters and activists. 

The next year, in 1997 in the town of Yining, in Xinjiang, riots had taken place for two straight days after a peaceful demonstration was brutally put down by the government and security officials.  Conservative estimates cited nine people dead and hundreds more injured.  As a result, under the auspicious of the new “strike hard campaign“, random and arbitrary arrests were made, Mosques and religious schools were raided and forced to close, activists were captured and public sentencing rallies were held across the Province.  This was all in the name of “rectification of social order.“  The following year, in August of 1998, then President Jiang Zemin paid a visit to the Xinjiang Province and essentially called for a “people’s war“ against separatist elements within the province.  As a result of this visit, successive “strike hard“ campaigns, each one more repressive than the last, have been launched.  Ultimately, this resulted in a national “strike hard campaign“ which was launched across the board in China, held as an anti–crime initiative in April of 2001. 

The brutal nature of the Strike Hard Campaign took a turn for the worst after the US attacks on September 11, 2001 where the “Strike Hard: High Pressure“ campaign took fold.  During this time period, the People’s Republic of China declared that any voice of decent coming from the Province was to be considered an anti–state act and ultimately resulted in brutal suppression.  Violent and non–violent activists were painted with the same “terrorist“ brush and dealt with the same.  The Chinese legal system is as such that it does not distinguish between political and criminal acts.  Hence, it becomes difficult to determine whether an accused is actually being charged for a legitimate crime or for exercising political rights.  This, combined with a flawed justice system with a sever lack of due process for defendants and institutional pressures on the judiciary to “process a maximum of cases in a minimum of time.“ 

The crackdown on religious activity has especially increased over the years.  Mosques, Imams and Islamic schools are now only allowed to exist so long as they have been sanctioned by the government.  Also, the provincial Communist Party committee along with the Xinjiang Autonomous Region government have instructed the local law enforcement to “establish a political verification system dossier to make sure the Imam meets political requirements in order to get a handle on the Imam’s ideological state at all times.“ Imams have also been forced to take “patriotic courses“ and if they in any way, shape or form deviate from the party line, they are subject to harsh investigation by the police.  There have been reports of Mosques being destroyed periodically as well. 

Restrictions are placed on people in terms of religious activity in state controlled institutions.  For example, people are not allowed to pray, they are not allowed to fast during the Holy Month of Ramadan, or show any other “pious behaviour“ that would be deemed inappropriate.  There have also been reports of people being charged for merely holding the Holy Quran.  Authorities have also been urged to crackdown and search for expressions of freedom.  Things like news media, literature works, arts performance, and distribution of leaflets and pamphlets and anything else that propagates separatist thought has been outlawed by the authorities.  Laws regarding social organizations have been used to suppress freedom of association and expression.  For example, the case of one Osman Yitmit, a local trader who was arrested in 2001 for setting up an aid fund for the poor people in his village.  The organization was never registered and Yitmit was sentenced to seven years in prison for allegedly engaging in separatist activities.  Moreover, the population is regularly faced with discrimination based on linguistic, religious, ethnic characteristics in the context of employment, administrative and political power, education and other responsibilities. 

What may seem to be a legitimate political as well as national security issue has been severely undermined by the lack of definition as to what constitutes terrorism.  The lack of a clear mandate has lead to the suppression of accurate information as to the occurrences in the North–western region of the country.  Furthermore, the lack of available information presented to the international community has lead to the blatant violation of human rights.  Having said this, the question of whether or not the issue of East Turkestan is in fact a legitimate one comes into question because it seems as though the People’s Republic of China is not willing to properly address legitimate issues in the realm of human rights and international law.  It’s as if they have swept these issues under the rug.  There have been occurrences where the government has told investors that security is not an issue in the region so as to not hinder economic investment.  Whereas on the other hand, anytime peaceful protesters gather on the streets to hold demonstrations, the “Islamic terrorism“ card is flashed and used by no ends.  Given that China is to become an economic superpower in the very near future, it has a responsibility to the international community to be transparent and honest in its own war on terror. 

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